MANAGEMENT MODELS AND DIFFERENTIAL AGENCY CHALLENGES ARISING IN AUSTRALIAN MULTI-TITLED TOURISM ACCOMMODATION PROPERTIES

Introduction
'Strata titling' is the term applied in Australia and New Zealand when referring to real estate that is segregated into separate ownership titles, but the separate titles own some property or infrastructure in common (Ball, 1984) . The term "strata title" is used in this paper in a manner synonymous to the way that "condominium" is used in the USA.
This paper reports the findings of a study that probes into agency issues arising in the relationship between unit owners and resident managers in strata title tourism accommodation (STTA) settings. More specifically, the study probes the differential potential for agency dynamics to occur in three distinct forms of STTA management delivery. The theoretical framework for the examination is provided by Lambert's (2001) four item agency conflict model. With respect to the STTA stakeholders identified by Cassidy and Guilding (2010) , it appears that the relationship between unit owners and resident managers is the most fundamental to the effective operation of a STTA complex.
STTA appears to be one of the fastest growing tourism accommodation sectors internationally (Pizam, 2006; Warnken, Guilding and Cassidy, 2008) . Securing an accurate gauge of this growth is challenging, however, as the actual volume of STTA properties has not been captured well in statistics compiled by tourism authorities or government bodies (Warnken et al, 2008) . Although international tourism accommodation statistics that focus on traditional hotels, motels and caravan parks can be found, there is a deficiency of statistics recording the number of holiday second homes or a classification of mixed-use buildings that would enable an analysis of tourist vs residential usage to be made. This problem has likely contributed to a volume of research that is startlingly meagre when considered in the light of the large and growing significance of the sector (Cassidy and Guilding, 2010) and also a deficient degree of attention directed to the issue by tourism policy makers.
As noted by Warnken et al (2008) , there appear to be multiple reasons accounting for the rapid growth of STTA complexes. From the unit purchaser's perspective, the ostentatious facet of second home ownership has been greatly facilitated by a substantial growth of disposal income over the last quarter of a century. This period has also seen enhanced mobility in connection with leisure pursuits and a move to shorter holiday breaks (Johns and Lynch, 2007) . All these developments appear supportive of increased demand for second home ownership. From the tourist's perspective, there appears to be an increase in the demand for accommodation that provides self-catering facilities. This type of accommodation is provided in the STTA model, but is not commonplace in conventional hotels. The STTA model is also appealing to developers as it provides the prospect of selling units 'off the plan', in advance of their construction. This brings forward the timing of property sale cash flow revenue for the developer, signifying a diminution of risk exposure. In addition, by subdividing a large tourism accommodation complex into smaller units of ownership, a developer is accessing a much broader market than is the case if the complex is sold in its entirety to one purchaser. A further factor contributing to STTA growth is the widespread uptake of internet based holiday accommodation bookings. This has eliminated a key competitive advantage enjoyed by those hotel chains that were of sufficient size to maintain sophisticated reservation systems prior to mass usage of internet website booking software programs. This range of factors has combined to provide considerable impetus for STTA growth worldwide.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides literary and theoretical context for the study. The research methodology applied is then described, followed by the findings section. The paper concludes with an interpretation of the study's main findings and an overview of its shortcomings.
Literary and theoretical context
The nascent nature of the STTA literature is evident from the fact that there appears to be no STTA focused study predating 2000. As will be evident from the review presented herein, however, several recent papers have taken an Australian perspective on STTA issues. Cassidy and Guilding (2010) provide an overview of the range of stakeholders involved in STTA. It is notable that two of the three stakeholders that Cassidy and Guilding classify as primary, ie, unit owners and resident managers (RMs), lie as the focus of the study reported herein. 1 The recency of the STTA literature is evident from the fact that the first STTA academic paper, prepared by Warnken, Russell and Faulkner, was published in 2003 . This study can be viewed as a forerunner of the Cassidy and Guilding stakeholder work. In its exploration of destination management challenges arising from rapid STTA growth, it notes the large number of distinct stakeholders involved in STTA complex management relative to players involved in hotel management. The paper also draws out the problem of rejuvenation for destination settings that have a high population of STTA complexes, as well as the need for planning 1 Tourists who stay in STTA complexes constitute the third primary stakeholder group identified by Cassidy and Guilding (2010 STTA typology is the second highly pertinent study. Cassidy and Guilding focus much of their attention on three primary generic types that they extract from the broader typology advanced. These three types are: 1) management service provision by small independent owner-operators in a single STTA apartment complex, 2) management service provision in strata titled hotels, and 3) management service provision by organisations that manage multiple STTA apartment complexes. Given the absence of any previous research focusing on differential agency issues arising across distinct STTA management contexts, this basic classificatory scheme appears to constitute an appropriate platform from which to build a context specific analysis of agency challenges arising in the STTA sector.
Accordingly, these three STTA contexts provide the basis for the agency analysis reported below. Cassidy and Guilding (2007) provide an internal management perspective in their examination of price setting practices adopted in Queensland, Australia STTA properties. A further complexity arising in STTA research concerns the way that holiday
properties in large complexes can be seen to lie on a 'part building ownership' continuum that spans the basic timeshare model, fractional timeshares and fully-owned STTA units.
STTA's relationship with the basic timeshare model and also fractional timeshares is explored by Warnken and Guilding (2009) . While timeshare properties exhibit many key differences from STTA properties (Warnken et al, 2008) , there are some facets of the timeshare sector that signify a degree of commonality with particular issues confronted in the STTA sector. For instance, like the STTA sector, most timeshare units will typically have some common property (eg, a lift in a high-rise timeshare complex or an entrance gate and road infrastructure in a horizontally configured timeshare property) and governance arrangements designed to ensure the suitable maintenance of common property in both types of complex have to be developed.
While the timeshare literature cannot be described as large, it is nevertheless more established than the STTA literature. A large part of the timeshare literature has been directed to explicating the timeshare model (eg., Crotts and Ragatz, 2002; Ragatz and Crotts, 2000; Upchurch, 2002) and also distilling factors that account for timeshare's rapid growth (eg., Lawton et al, 1998; Upchurch, 2000; Upchurch and Gruber, 2002) . It is notable that a particular avenue of timeshare research that focuses on consumer value deriving from timeshare ownership (Crotts and Ragatz, 2002; Sparks et al, 2008) has not been mirrored in the STTA literature. With respect to the study described herein, no study concerned with agency issues arising between timeshare unit owners and managers of timeshare complexes has been found in the literature.
Agency theory focuses on relationships where one party, 'the principal'
(frequently represented by a business owner or owners), assigns work to a second party, 'the agent' (frequently represented by an employee of the business owned by the principal). The classic agency relationship involves the principal delegating some decision making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) .
Portraying the relationship between RMs and STTA unit owners as a principal-agent exchange (Mills, 1990 ) appears appropriate, as RMs provide letting and caretaking services to STTA unit owners. The scope of decision making authority typically extended to RMs by STTA unit owners includes the development of a letting marketing strategy, the setting of unit letting rates and also the assignment of units to reservation bookings (Cassidy and Guilding, 2007) .
The development of agency theory is often traced back to Berle and Means (1932) , although some writers suggest that one can go back to Adam Smith's (1776) The Wealth of Nations. Letza, Sun and Kirkbride (2004) point out that the agency problem was effectively identified by Smith when he argued that company directors were unlikely to be as careful with other peoples' money as with their own. Subsequently, the firm has been widely viewed as a nexus of contracting relationships between individuals.
Much of the application of agency theory has evolved through the financial economics literature, with a primary focus on the relationship between managers and shareholders. This focus subsequently broadened into the more general management field with researchers drawing on agency theory to examine organizational behaviour, organizational theory and strategic management aspects (Eisenhardt, 1985 (Eisenhardt, , 1988 (Eisenhardt, , 1989 Kosnik 1987) . Lambert (2001) sees agency theory as constituting one of the most important theoretical paradigms underpinning much accounting research in the 1980s and 1990s. The primary agency theory features that have made it attractive to researchers are its recognition of conflicts of interest, incentive problems and also mechanisms for controlling incentive problems (Bohren, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert, 2001 ).
2 Sharma (1997) conceives of agency theory as founded on the triad of agency opportunism, information and risk. The strength of the theory is that it leverages these three fundamental concepts, together with an emphasis on efficiency, to define a problem structure that is inherent to a wide range of business transactions. Eisenhardt notes that the:
'domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behaviour, but have differing goals and different attitudes toward risk ' (1989, p.59 ).
The cornerstone of agency theory is the assumption that the interests of principals and agents diverge and that agents have a propensity to behave opportunistically in a manner that is inconsistent with the interests of principals. Agency theory recognises two distinct costs that a principal can incur when attempting to minimise the possibility of an agent acting opportunistically: (1) monitoring costs and (2) metering costs (Sharma, 1997) . The former include all costs resulting from monitoring the behaviour of an agent.
If monitoring is impractical, due to prohibitively high costs, a principal will incur metering costs as a result of greater reliance placed on measuring agent action outcomes.
The capacity of the principal to manage the potential of an agent acting opportunistically is compromised, however, due to information asymmetry that frequently favours agents and also the potential for the two contracting parties to hold differing attitudes to risk. 
Research Method
Exploratory interview data has been collected to enable examination of the issues at hand. In this section, the sample of interviewees are described together with data collection and analysis procedures adopted.
Thirty five semi-structured interviews were conducted and transcribed. These interviews were with 15 industry experts, 10 resident managers and 10 owners. Industry experts are those who have extensive and broad experience in the STTA field. and O6 also own two units, however in each instance these are located in the same complex. The type of management refers to one of three organizational forms that operate the complex where the unit is located (to be described in the next section). The table's final column, details the number of years the owner has held the property. More than one figure is reported for those owners owning two units.
Insert Table 2 about here Table 3 identifies managers as M1, M2, etc. Location of the complex the managers are operating is broken down into both state and regional or CBD locations.
The next three columns detail the total units in the complex, the number of units in the letting pool and a percentage indication of the proportion of units in the letting pool. The subsequent two columns detail the time the manager has worked at his current and previous complexes, with N/A signifying no previous experience in accommodation management. The final column highlights whether the management is a husband and wife team, an employee or a family business.
Insert Table 3 
about here
The interviews had a typical duration ranging between one and two hours. The industry expert and resident manager interviews all took place at the participants' places of work. All unit owner interviews were conducted by phone. Use of an interview protocol for recording information during the interviews assisted in data collection.
Clarification of any ambiguous information gathered was achieved by way of email correspondence with the participants after their interview. Confirmation or clarification was also achieved by consulting corporate websites and follow up phone calls.
The interview protocol used for data collection was informed by Lambert's (2001) model that identifies four distinct dimensions of conflicting interest arising between principals and agents:
(i) an agent may exert low effort in their work,
(ii) the agent may take an organisation's resources for their private consumption, (iii) the two parties may have differential time horizons e.g., an agent would be less concerned about future period effects of current actions if he plans to withdraw from the relationship, (iv) the agent and principal may have differential aversions to risk.
A tailored version of the interview protocol was developed for each of the interviewee sub samples (ie, the industry experts, the unit owners and the resident managers As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) , table shells were utilized as part of the data collection process. To further strengthen the collection phase, interpretive notes were taken throughout the interviews and completed immediately after each interview to minimize loss of insights secured. Schatzman and Strauss (1973) claim that qualitative data analysis primarily entails classifying things, persons, events and the properties that categorize them. Merriam (1988) and Marshall and Rossman (1999) contend that data collection and analysis will tend to be a simultaneous process in qualitative research. During the analysis period, the data was organized categorically and chronologically and reviewed repeatedly. Identifying and describing patterns and themes from the perspective of the participant(s) and then attempting to understand and explain these patterns and themes has been undertaken, as suggested by Agar (1980) . A list of ideas, issues or themes was chronicled, as suggested by Merriam (1988) , in the researcher's field diary.
Lofland (1974) suggests that although data collection and analysis strategies are similar across qualitative methods, the way findings are reported is diverse. Miles and Huberman (1984) address the importance of creating a data display and note that the narrative text is the most frequent form of display for qualitative data. The findings are presented in descriptive narrative form in the next section.
Findings and discussion
By way of background, it is important to recognize that the resident management service in Australian and New Zealand STTA properties is typically established as a business by the original STTA complex developer. This business (widely referred to as a 'management rights' business) is sold and provides the purchaser with the right to draw a commission from running the property's letting pool and to draw a salary as compensation for providing maintenance services (Guilding et al, 2005 The extent of this agency challenge can be expected to vary over time in a manner aligned to the economic climate. IE2 observed:
Of course there is a potential conflict and it is fine when the market is fine. When the market turns sour, all the tensions come through.
Lambert's four item agency theory model that was introduced above is drawn upon in the remainder of this section to structure interview observations concerning differential agency challenges arising across Types A, B and C of STTA management service delivery.
Effort aversion
Effort aversion on the part of the agent can be viewed as not exerting an optimal effort when undertaking work, or, more simply stated: 'slacking off'. 
M8 supports this view and comments:
5 It was observed that reimbursements made to unit owners were not determined on a consistent basis. Some Type B unit owners earn a commission based on letting rental revenue, while others are paid a fixed rental return for placing their unit in the letting pool in a manner resembling a leasing arrangement. These different forms of owner reimbursement are significant, as the former signifies that some of the risk relating to uncertain returns is born by the unit owner, however, the latter approach signifies that all of the risk over uncertain returns is born by the manager.
That is a big issue. I guess the only way they could question this is if the returns weren't there.
Diversion of resources
The unit owner interviewees were particularly forthcoming with respect to the diversion of resources agency challenge. From comments made, it appears that this challenge is not limited to one type of organizational form. IE 3 commented:
They can all do it if they want to. There is almost no possibility for people to do much about it.
Observations made support Guilding et al's (2005) view of three moral hazard
issues arising in the STTA manager / unit owner relationship. The first concerns the possibility of a resident manager accepting a payment or 'back-hander' in return for placing building sub-contract work with a particular service provider. Comments made by interviewees in this study suggest this type of activity may be widespread, for instance IE7 commented:
I have little faith in unit managers generally. I know the manager at the X (complex name) takes 10% of tradesmen's costs -kickbacks, dodgy quotes etc, and ensures that the chairman of the body corp's unit is number one for booking. …. Y (Type B) adds an 'administration fee' of $20 plus GST to every tradespersons' invoice for work done in our unit -plumbing, electrical, repairs etc.
The second moral hazard example noted by Guilding et al. (2005) concerns the possibility of a resident manager not recording a short term rental of a unit and failing to make the appropriate reimbursement to the unit owner. Comments made by this study's interviewees suggest that this practice may be more prevalent in Type As than Types B and C, as accountability systems tend to be more developed in the latter two organizational forms.
The third moral hazard example cited by Guilding et al. (2005) concerns the possibility of a resident manager overstating the cost of maintenance or housekeeping, and keeping the difference between the costs reported to the owner and the payment made to the tradesperson. Several interviewee comments lend support to the existence of such practice.
Type A: diversion of resources issues
Type A operators were cited as having the highest potential for diverting resources in a self-interested manner. IE4 commented:
If you have central reservation networks, it has got to be a much lower degree. So Mum and Dads would be the highest rating.
Referring to a Type A STTA complex, O1 expressed concerns suggesting a diversion of resources relating to income and also overstatement of costs:
With the previous managers, we had 
Types B and C: diversion of resources issues
Managers representing Type B and C operations felt that the greater levels of accountability, transparency and corporate governance procedures apparent in larger organizational structures reduced the possibility of management diverting resources in a self-interested manner relative to the situation in Type As. M9 commented:
There is little scope in our organisation for error. The literature provides extensive commentaries on the problems arising from agent opportunism where principals can be seen to be at the mercy of agents (e.g. Bazerman, Neale, Valley, Zaajac & Kim, 1992; Herman, 1981; Kesner, Shapiro & Sharma, 1994; Kosnik, 1987; McLaughlin, 1990) . Sharma (1997) notes that these problems arise in many commonplace business interactions such as attorney-client, builder-owner and doctor-patient, where more informed agents serve less informed principals. In light of the findings presented here, it appears the STTA owner-manager business relationship can be added to Sharma's (1997) listing of settings where the incidence of agent opportunism appears to be high.
Differentials in Time Horizons
A time horizon differential arises when the envisaged time horizon that either the unit owner or resident manager sees for their STTA involvement departs significantly from the time horizon envisaged by the other party with which they are engaged in a 
They mostly have short-term contracts.
From an owner's perspective, IE7 expressed a degree of frustration over the propensity of Type A managers to take a short-term perspective to their STTA involvement:
Mum and Dads are a great concern; we have had 5 managers in 10 years.
It is notable that several interviewee comments concerning type A STTA complexes also highlight concerns over a tendency for a short-termist perspective to be dominant for many owners. M3 commented:
I think some of our owners just want to own their units just for a short time, like make a killing and then leave.
In a similar vein, O1 stated:
Generally, as an owner you don't really buy for long term.
Types B and C: time horizon differential issues
There was a high consensus view amongst interviewees associated with Types B and C STTA complexes that operators in these complexes are less short-termist than Type A operators. M5 observed:
I have not known of any company that operated on a short term.
M9 agreed:
I think most professional managers are into it long-term. Most owners would be medium term or longer.
IE10, provided an alternate view:
You do get individual operators who want to be out within a two year period and they probably have a bit of a shorter vision on where they are going. Generally this is a pretty tough industry, so I find a lot of unit owners hold their units longer
than the managers last.
Risk aversion
Interviewees were asked to comment on the extent to which STTA managers hold different attitudes to risk relative to STTA unit owners. Agency theorists see agents as more risk averse than principals, as agents cannot diversify their employment. A shareholder, acting as the archetypal principal, can achieve diversification through holding a portfolio of investments, however. Guilding et al (2005) note that similar to a company manager situation, small resident managers cannot achieve job diversification, but that they do hold the equivalent of an equity interest in their Type A STTA complex, as the value of their investment in the complex will be affected by the complex's letting pool performance. In light of this, a Type A manager is likely to experience heightened risk aversity. In Type B and C operations, however, the managers are generally employees whose attitude to risk is likely to resemble that of a conventionally employed manager.
IE10 elaborated on this issue from a Type A manager's perspective: Interviewee comments with respect to whether managers or unit owners have assumed greater risk and which of the two parties is most risk averse appeared to be heavily influenced by the nature of the interviewee's STTA involvement. The unit owners felt that their investment was controlled by the manager and that this exposed them to risk. Conversely, in a manner supportive of IE10's perspective cited above, managers claimed that as their initial investment in the business and the unit complex was more substantial, they bore the greatest risk.
M2 responded to the question "who takes on the most risk, owners or managers?" in the following way:
I think the manager. The manager has got the biggest investment in the complex.
What affects the price of my management rights is how well I am getting people
into these units at a good price, so the owner makes good money.
M3 agreed:
I would definitely say us. We have invested in the base and it was our decision and that could backfire if it went the wrong way.
Conversely, O8's following comment is representative of several other unit owners' view on this matter:
I would say that we, as the owners, are more at risk. We rely on their honesty and their ability to manage the complex properly in getting units filled. So that is why
I don't use them anymore. Guilding et al's (2005) conclusion that managers assume greater risk than unit owners was made in the context of Type A STTA complexes. This study's broader scope that incorporates an examination of STTA Types B and C has uncovered a need to extend and qualify Guilding et al's view that STTA managers will be highly risk averse. In the case of Types B and C STTA complexes, there appears little reason to expect that the risk aversity of managers will not converge with that of managers engaged in a conventional employment setting.
Conclusion
This study has investigated the nature of agency challenges arising between unit owners and managers in three distinct modes of STTA delivery that have been denoted as Types A, B and C. Type A refers to small sole trader resident manager operations that typically involve a husband and wife team operating a single STTA complex. Type B management services are provided in hotels where the ownership of rooms is strata title based. Type C refers to organisations that purchase the rights to provide resident manager services in multiple STTA apartment complexes. The key contribution of this study derives from the fact that it is the first work to provide a systematic investigation of differential issues arising from distinct modes of STTA management delivery. This focus has not only enabled an advancement to be made on the insights provided by Guilding et al's (2005) more generic study, it has facilitated a deeper understanding of the manner in which contingency factors can result in the manifestation of a range of STTA agency challenges.
A highly summarized version of the study's findings are presented in Table 4 .
From this table, it is apparent that agent effort aversion, agent diversion of resources, and differential time horizon agency challenges appear to be most evident in Type A STTA operations. Considered holistically, these observations suggest that Type A STTA complexes will suffer from the greatest agency problems between unit owners and managers. It has also been found that Type A managers are likely to experience the greatest aversion to risk. While the significance of this factor will be dependent on the risk profile of unit owners in a particular building, it appears that the propensity of a Type A manager to experience a high risk aversity points to a further agency challenge in Type A STTA complexes.
Insert Table 4 about here
The observation that a STTA manager's effort aversion is greatest in Type A was not expected. As they are self employed and stand to personally benefit financially from greater letting revenues generated, one line of a priori reasoning leads to the expectation that Type A STTA managers would exhibit low levels of effort aversion. Despite this reasoning, no interviewee comments supporting this view were noted. In light of this, further research that probes into whether Type A managers exhibit high effort aversion with respect to some dimensions of their work and low effort aversion with respect to other dimensions of their work would likely be revealing. If collecting interview data, we believe it would be insightful to seek interviewee perspectives on the extent to which STTA Type A manager's self-employment situation impacts on their work ethic and motivation. Given this study's observation that managers may exhibit heightened levels of effort aversion following a protracted period of owner criticism, the length of time that a manager has held his position and also the nature of the relationship he experiences with owners could be important contingent factors affecting Type A manager work attitude. It could be that in the presence of high owner animosity, a Type A manager's self employment situation would provide greater scope to act on a desire to limit work effort expended.
While consideration of • Notifications are to be placed on the certificates of title of the proposed lots confirming that the units are to be used for short stay occupancy only.
• Development refurbishment is to be managed by the facility manager on a development-wide basis through the establishment of a refurbishment reserve.
• Upgrading of fixtures, fittings and décor by unit owners is not permitted.
A particularly notable facet of these provisions is the extent to which they have been influenced by tourism policy makers, as opposed to the developer lobby. It is expected that these provisions will greatly ameliorate some major challenges that have compromised the delivery of a quality tourism accommodation service in STTAs. For instance, RMs in new WA STTA complexes will no longer have to manage in a context of competing interests between resident owners and investor owners and they will avoid the challenge of managing a property with inconsistent levels of accommodation refurbishment and décor. These factors signify that the WA STTA model is deserving of research attention, as it augurs well for improved sustainability of a quality STTA service delivery.
While the significance of this study draws primarily from its illustration of differential agency conflicts arising in business transactions between managers and shareholders, the study has a much wider significance in promoting understanding of some key contemporary dynamics in tourism/urban development and destination management. A particular tourism destination challenge associated with the STTA form of tourism accommodation delivery (most notably in Types A and C), when compared to conventional hotels, relates to an absence of any contribution by STTA complexes to the tourism equity of a destination. By 'tourism equity' we mean the provision of nonaccommodation related infrastructure that adds value to the tourism experience of destination visitors. Many hotels offer attractions such as restaurants, bars, aesthetically appealing foyer areas and night club entertainment. Any visitor to a destination can indulge in such hotel service provision, regardless of whether they are a registered hotel guest. The same cannot be said for most STTA complexes. Not only is such tourism equity infrastructure lacking in STTA complexes, in many cases a non-resident cannot access the common property of a STTA complex due to swipe card access arrangements.
Given the growth of STTA, the dearth of tourism equity infrastructure provided by most STTA complexes can be expected to represent an increasingly challenging issue for tourism destination policy makers.
This study suffers from all the shortcomings generally associated with qualitative research that include scope for subjectivity in data analysis and the possibility of researcher bias being manifest in the collection and analysis of data. In addition, it could be argued that the three archetypal forms of STTA delivery that have been examined can be criticized for being under-defined. For instance, STTA Type B could be broken into two categories comprising branded and non-branded hotels. Further, the Type C classification could be further sub-divided into publically traded management rights operators and private entity management rights operators. It is notable, however, that such shortcomings are bound to be present in any analysis that is based on a classification of organization types, as no classification basis is completely robust. It should also be recognized that an attempt to classify STTA enterprise types into more than three subcategories would have reduced the differences across the STTA types investigated, thereby rendering the observations made in the study more opaque.
In terms of further research into the STTA phenomenon, a promising line of enquiry offering a high propensity to build on the study reported herein would be to investigate the role and significance of the locus of power between STTA unit owners and resident managers. It is notable that when Type A resident managers purchase management rights in Queensland, they are required to obtain a licence enabling them to operate a trust fund, but their right to manage properties is limited to that complex where they have purchased the management rights. STTA unit owners, however, have the right to choose whoever they wish to act as letting agent for their property, as the resident manager does not have a letting contract for a building, merely an authorisation to operate a letting business . In terms of the power balance between STTA unit owner and resident manager, this suggests one instance of a power imbalance favouring the unit owner. This power imbalance is not as much in evidence for Type C management operators, due to their ownership of management rights in several properties. Other dimensions of power imbalance concern the unit owner's option to fundamentally change the status of their investment by electing to reside in their unit, ie, remove it from the letting pool (a resident manager is unable to make such a radical change in the nature of their investment), and also the much larger investment made by the purchaser of a management rights' business relative to the investment made by a STTA unit owner. The extensive management literature on power provides conceptual frameworks that could be drawn upon if seeking to further theorise on the nature and significance of power in STTA manager / unit owner relationships (see Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) .
The growing significance of STTA properties in the international tourism landscape signifies that there is a continuing fundamental need to further advance our understanding of the phenomenon through research. A consideration of the relativity of the volume of hotels worldwide to the amount of hotel management research reported in the literature, highlights the extent to which the worldwide growth of STTA properties has radically outstripped the quantum of research attention directed to STTA issues.
Acknowledging this issue and securing a better understanding of how sustainable STTA development can be achieved would be beneficial for the myriad of STTA stakeholders who include tourists, investors, STTA managers, government, industry and academe. It is hoped that this study will provide a platform to stimulate debate, discussion and further research in the STTA field. 
